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"Privatization in Post-communist Countries" 
Coordinator: Barbara Błaszczyk 
Work on this project, financed by the Committee of Scientific Research (KBN), began 
in December 1994 and consists of research focusing on legal and institutional aspects of 
privatization as well as the courses and outcomes of privatization processes under way in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the first stage of the project, country reports 
on privatization in those countries where the ownership transformation process is most 
advanced were prepared. In the second stage, reports are to be prepared on particular aspects 
of the privatization process. Foreign participants in the project include scholars from the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Russia, and Germany. Publication of the 
papers prepared during the course of the project in the Studies and Analyses series is 
currently under way. The publication of a book is also intended to conclude the project. In 
November 1995 a two-day seminar was held on voucher privatization and management-
employee buyouts. An international conference is being planned for April 1996, in which 
experts in privatization policy and practice will participate in a discussion of the research 
results, which we hope will facilitate their dissemination both in countries which are leaders 
in the systemic transformation process and those which are less advanced. Conclusion of the 
project is planned for June 1996. 
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EXPERIENCE WITH MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE 
BUYOUTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
 
1. Peculiarities of Management-Employee Buyouts Within the 
Russian Privatization Model 
The uniqueness of Russia with respect to privatization lies not only in its far from 
optimal combination of different particular methods of privatization (this is typical of the 
majority of countries in transition). Russia became the only post-Socialist state 
characterized by a combination of different approaches towards the privatization process as 
a whole. The voucher privatization technique, borrowed from the Czech scheme for free 
distribution of state property to citizens at the theoretical level (but not with respect to the 
exact technical implementation), was supplemented by a real possibility for domination by 
"inside investors" at the level of legal security (as was the case in Yugoslavia) as well as at 
the level of the actual ownership structure in the privatized enterprises (as in Romania), 
which triggered an evolutionary development in the direction of a managerial revolution on 
a scale which is unmatched throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The purchase of large 
blocks of shares occurring as a result of the free trade in vouchers proved to be practically 
incompatible with the fiscal, investment and restructuring orientation which characterized 
this process in East European countries. In an attempt to overcome this limitation, emphasis 
was placed on large "outside investors" in the monetary stage of privatization, as had been 
done in Hungary and the former GDR. The common denominator throughout the entire 
course of privatization were the attempts by the administrative bodies controlling separate 
branches of the economy to secure considerable blocks of shares for the state in a number of 
those sectors. 
The general scheme of privatization in Russia was based on the division of a 
considerable portion of state property into relatively small blocks of shares and their 
subsequent distribution to large numbers of people. The recipients belonged to different 
groups, depending on the particular variant chosen. The choice of this scheme (adopted in 
1992) was based on the necessity to achieve a compromise between the goverment, the 
parliament, and certain important social groups, including the employees of the enterprises 
which were to be privatized (mainly in industry), state employees, employees in the non-
production sphere, and emerging private business. 
Vouchers distributed to the whole population at the end of 1992 became an instrument 
for ownership transformation. Citizens now had the ability to exchange them directly for 
shares of privatized enterprises or for securities issued by check investment funds (CIFs), 
which traded the vouchers thus obtained for enterprise shares. It was also possible to sell 
vouchers for cash to other citizens or to commercial institutions which later could make use 
of the vouchers at check auctions.  A. Radygin 
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At the same time, the State Privatization Program enacted on June 11, 1992, 
introduced  an extensive system of privileges for the employees of the enterprises to be 
privatized, including their management as a separate category. Those privileges included 
acquisition of free and privileged shares and the ability of managers and employees of the 
enterprise to pay for shares partly with vouchers instead of cash. Along with other variants 
(see Appendix 1 of Radygin [1996]), this system included the possibility of redemption in a 
closed subscription (i.e., on a non-competitive basis) of 51 per cent of the shares of the 
privatized enterprises at their book value, with an insignificant surchange coefficient of 1.7 
(this was the so-called second variant, which became the most popular one). Later this 
system of privileges was completely reaffirmed by the State Privatization Program adopted 
on December 24, 1993, and, in a slightly changed form, by the general guidelines of the 
program from July 1, 1994 onwards. 
As a result, the distribution of former state property went on predominantly not in the 
form of voucher usage by citizens through check auctions and CIFs, but through closed 
subscriptions at enterprises in which their employees and management participated. Thus, 
the average share of the authorized capital of the joint-stock companies replacing state 
enterprises which was sold on check auctions for vouchers was 18-19 per cent, in some 
months rising to a maximum level of 23-23.5 per cent. Through July 1, 1994 (the date on 
which voucher validity expired), three fourths of the enterprises which had undergone the 
share distribution procedure since the beginning of the privatization process chose the 
second variant, described above, which emphasized closed subscriptions. (By January 1, 
1995, this number was somewhat reduced to 73.2 per cent.) During this same period, the 
third variant, based on the purchase of 20 per cent (raised to 30 per cent from 1994 
onwards) of the shares at their nominal value by a group of persons (in fact, the enterprise 
managers) on the condition that they assume the responsibility for averting bancruptcy of 
the enterprise, was applied to a very limited extent (by 1.9 per cent of all enterprises having 
undergone the share distribution procedure). 
Nevertheless, it is important not to exaggerate the role of enterprises that chose the 
second variant (the insider privilege variant) in the process of distribution of shares in the 
national economy as a whole. 
On the one hand, although they undoubtedly dominate in terms of sheer numbers, the 
main part of the authorized capital within the whole bulk of the enterprises that underwent 
the share distribution procedure seems to belong to those that used other variants. Thus, 
according to the results of 1994, 60.8 per cent of enterprises privatized during the last year 
through share distributions chose the second variant, but at the same time, only 18.8 per 
cent of the total authorized capital was actually held by those enterprises. Even taking into 
account the 7.4 per cent of joint-stock companies established by means of reformation of 
rental enterprises (which in the majority of cases means "insider" domination), the total 
share of enterprises controlled by "inside" owners was about 22 per cent. It is doubtful 
whether the previous years, 1992 and 1993, would provide a different picture. Obviously, in 
large enterprises with a substantial production potential and consequently substantial 
authorized capital, it was impossible for the employees and managers in the majority of 
cases to redeem the controlling block of shares by closed subscription; therefore, they had to 
adopt the first variant, in which insider privileges were smaller in scope (one fourth of the Experience with Management and Employee Buyouts... 
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non-voting shares are obtained by the employees free of charge in a closed subscription, 10 
per cent are sold to them at a discounted price, 5 per cent are sold to the management, and 
the rest is sold to outsiders for vouchers or cash). 
This situation is the result of the initial distribution of joint-stock capital within the 
framework of the voucher program and the domination of "inside" investors (which was a 
compromise necessary for the launching of the privatization program). 
 
2.  The Initial Structure of Joint-Stock Capital and Its 
Subsequent Development 
The short-term result of the approaches described above (i.e., the result which emerged 
during and shortly after the completion of the privatization program of 1992-1994) was the 
establishment of an indistinct ownership structure in the majority of privatized enterprises, 
where no single group of shareholders could achieve a stable majority of shares in the 
authorized capital and at the same time feared all possible changes in that ownership 
structure and attempted to prevent them. In practice it strengthened the positions and the 
influence of the managers who had run the enterprise before privatization. 
 
2.1 Some Estimates of the Initial Ownership Structure During and After 
Privatization 
 
There are a number of different qualitative estimations of the distribution of joint-
stock capital of privatized enterprises. On the basis of research conducted in 143 large and 
medium-size enterprises in 32 regions by Joseph Blasi’s team in 1994 in 32 regions, the 
conclusion was made that on the average 65 per cent of the shares of a privatized Russian 
enterprise belonged to "insiders" (8.6 per cent were owned by the managers), 22 per cent by 
"outside" investors (11 per cent were owned by investors who possessed more than 5 per 
cent of the enterprise’s shares), and 13 per cent by the state. Median values were 60 (5), 20 
and 12 per cent respectively (Blasi, 1994). The Russian researcher V. Soupian estimates the 
situation approximately in the same way: on the average 60-65 per cent of joint-stock 
capital of the privatized enterprises in 1994 belonged to non-managerial employees and 15-
17 per cent to managerial staff.
1 
                                              
1 We should point out that a similar investigation carried out by Blasi in the first half of 1995 (in 133 privatized 
enterprises in 33 regions of Russia) resulted in the following conclusions: on the average the insiders (management 
included) owned as much as 57.06 per cent of shares (median value 53 per cent), the outsiders 30.56 per cent (median 
value: 30.00 per cent), and the state 12.61 per cent (median value: 6.50 per cent). This gives us another proof of the 
existence of certain tendencies in the ownership structure which will be analyzed in detail. A. Radygin 
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The broadest investigations of the initial structure of joint-stock capital were carried 
out in 1994 by the Russian Marketing Association. The survey covered 1,000 joint-stock 
companies established through the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The results are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Distribution of blocks of shares in joint-stock companies established in the 
course of privatization (by branches and main investors as of April 1994, %) 
Shareholders  The size of blocks of shares by branches (%) 
  Engineering  Chemical Ind. Food Ind. Light Ind.  Average
Employees 51.86  54.50 51.26 56.09  52.01
Managers 14.81  8.25 13.38 13.15  14.16
Large outsiders  12.64  9.25 10.83 7.28  11.53
Small outsiders  7.69  11.00 9.36 6.41  8.17
State 13.00  17.00 15.17 17.07  14.13
Total 100  100 100 100  100
Source: Braverman et al., 1994 
It is evident from the data presented here (which are consistent with the results of other 
research) that on the average, in the spring of 1994, the insiders’ share in privatized 
enterprises amounted to 66 per cent and the outsiders’ share to about 20 per cent, while the 
state share averaged 14 per cent and did not exceed 17 per cent. We can safely assert that 
these figures represent a fairly objective reflection of the pattern of ownership in Russian 
privatized enterprises existing when the privatization program was concluded. In other 
words, these data represent the typical initial structure of joint-stock capital of Russian 
enterprises privatized in the voucher program. Now let us consider the key quantitative 
tendencies characteristic of its formation and subsequent development. 
In the process of initial securing of property rights in privatized enterprises, two 
tendencies can be clearly distinguished: the formation of a stock of Russian corporate 
capital which is closed to outside investors and the preservation of regional and branch 
monopolies. 
The first tendency is a result of the use of the privileges of the first and second models 
(see Appendix 1 in Radygin [1996]). The complex of extensive privileges for employees 
(free and preferentially priced shares, distribution of shares, and privatization funds 
financed from the enterprises’ revenues), together with the widespread practice of lowering 
the price of privatized property, permitted them to become the owners of large national 
firms at minimum expense, by keeping controlling blocks of shares in possession of the 
employees and the management or by putting the state-owned share under trust control. Due 
to closed share subscriptions, the organization of auctions to which institutional investors 
were given limited access, and especially to the wide dispersion of private investors, a new 
capital structure was initially formed which formally fell under the legal status of an open-
type joint-stock company but in many cases resembled the capital structure of a closed-type 
corporation in reality. Experience with Management and Employee Buyouts... 
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This tendency is realized in practice throughout a whole complex of formal and, more 
importantly, informal restrictions which the management of privatized enterprises places on 
the sale of shares by the employees to outside investors in order to retain control over the 
enterprises, to ensure itself an income, and to preserve jobs. The last motivation is also very 
typical of the majority of employees who do not belong to the management. According to 
the data from one of the inspections of check investment funds in Russia, 48 per cent of the 
funds that had tried to increase their share in the joint-stock capital of enterprises which had 
been privatized at least partially through check auctions stated that the most serious barrier 
was created by the efforts of the management of these enterprises to prevent the sale of 
shares by the employees to outsiders, and 23 per cent of the funds affirmed that the 
securities market on which they were operating was controlled by the managers (Pistor, 
Frydman, and Rapaczynski [1994]). 
The effect of regional and branch monopolies under the new conditions imposes strict 
limitations on the effective flow of capital. Schemes for financial flows are being created 
under which those flows can remain isolated and yet allow not only mobilization, but also 
redistribution, of capital among firms with varying profitability located within a given 
regional or branch structure without resorting to the stock market. The tendency towards 
territorial and financial isolation impedes the free flow of financial capital and is clearly 
reflected in the will to establish holding companies and industrial groups which possess a 
common commercial bank or investment company as an important element of the structure. 
The indissolubility of technological and industrial-economic ties is typically used as an 
argument for merger, but the effort to establish financial systems mobilizing local capital 
and imposing limitations on penetration by "outside" (trade and bank) capital is an even 
more powerful stimulus (see IEP [March 1994], pp. 164-168). 
The tendency towards branch isolationism manifests itself through the reservation of 
controlling blocks of shares in "privatized" enterprises for the state, which can later be 
transferred to the management on a trust basis in order to establish some holding structures 
and financial-industrial groups or kept as a "golden share" which can provide the state 
administrative bodies with a considerable degree of control over the enterprises. The 
tendency towards regional isolation, on the other hand, manifests itself through the 
placement of local goverment officials in management positions in the privatized 
companies. This practice is justified on the basis of the presence of unsold blocks of shares 
(potentially intended for future sales), secret preferences given to local banks in the course 
of actual privatization procedures, and trading and brokerage capital which is often 
connected with local goverment bodies or the management of privatized enterprises and the 
establishment of dependent firm registrars controlling the secondary redistribution of 
already privatized property. 
Both tendencies will have a mixed impact on the viability of Russian corporations 
because the mechanisms by which they are realized are highly heterogeneous in nature. To 
some extent it is possible to consider these tendencies as a defensive reaction of enterprises 
and regions, but in any case they will not determine the development of the structure of 
capital in Russia in the medium term. That will depend on the intensive process of 
redistribution of property rights that has already begun. 
 A. Radygin 
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2.2. Redistribution of Property Rights: Main Conclusions and Tendencies 
In spite of the existing exclusivity of the structure of joint-stock capital in Russian 
privatized enterprises, an intensive process of transfer of property rights began already 
during the implementation of the privatization program. This affected the shares obtained 
during the first stage of the process by outside investors and the managers of enterprises. In 
other words, the initial floating of shares of privatized enterprises (all the above-mentioned 
limitations of the dynamics of their capital structure notwithstanding) represents a relatively 
short period of initial securing of property rights which is inevitably followed by a series of 
secondary transactions (the ideal result of which should be the emergence of an "ideal 
owner"). 
Another important observation concerns the beginning of the process of concentration 
of joint-stock capital which was initially dispersed as a result of voucher privatization. 
The third important conclusion is that within the limits of the model of privatization 
operating between 1992 and the first half of 1994 (and even more so between July 1994 and 
July 1995, when the privatization process practically stopped), one of the most promising 
methods of acquisition of the capital of Russian privatized enterprises (and often the only 
one) for any outside investor _ whether foreign or native _ was the purchase of a share of 
capital by means of secondary trade in the shares from the first issue or in the course of a 
supplementary share issue. Undoubtedly, the tendencies described in the previous section 
represent a barrier to such acquisition, but the beginning of the process of erosion of the 
initial structure and the intentions of some Russian enterprises to carry out a new issue of 
shares inevitably weaken such barriers. 
Let us examine the most typical variants and trends affecting the structure of joint-
stock capital formed in the course of initial floating of shares. 
First, the process of "erosion" of the initial block of shares received by the employees 
during the closed subscription began. Research shows that the management in the majority 
of enterprises succeeded in acquiring between 15 and 25 per cent of shares by use of the 
following methods: proportional distribution of shares in a closed subscription (beyond a 
required minimum received by every employee), options, repurchasing of shares from the 
employees after the end of the closed subscription, purchase of shares on closed auctions, 
and use of "fronts." Broker agencies and other professional intermediaries were very active 
in buying out small blocks of shares belonging to the employees. In another typical 
situation, engineering and technical staff members and skilled workers become holders of 
relatively large blocks of shares (e.g., 1-2 per cent), while many of the rank-and-file 
employees sell their shares within 2-3 months after the receiving them. This was promoted, 
for example, by the fact that only one third of the total number of privatized joint-stock 
companies were going to pay dividends according to the financial results of 1993. In many 
cases the market price offered by intermediaries looks attractive to the employees. Thus, for 
example, in the summer of 1994 many employees of Mosenergo were selling their shares 
aquired through closed subscription for checks at the price of 120-200 rubles per share Experience with Management and Employee Buyouts... 
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(while the nominal value of shares was 1,000 rubles, and market value in July,1995 
comprised already about 1500 rubles). 
Naturally, share liquidity in the great majority of enterprises is as yet out of the 
question, and it is possible to sell them only to an intermediary acting to fulfil a specific 
order (received from an outside purchaser or from the management itself) or with the 
purpose of reselling the block of shares thus acquired at a different price on the market. 
New problems also emerged: among them blatant discrimination against outside 
shareholders by enterprise management, an illegal ban on sale of shares to outsiders by 
employees imposed by the management under threat of discharge, illegal restrictions in the 
company bylaws as to the upper limits on blocks of shares, etc. 
The possibility of sales of shares by the employees to outside purchasers which are not 
controlled by the authorities gives rise to certain fears on the part of the management, 
especially if those purchasers offer an extremely high price (in one Moscow planning 
organization an outside purchaser _ a bank _ offered a price of over 50 times the nominal 
value for one share; in order to prevent the loss of control the management had to offer the 
same price to the employees). Obviously, shareholders sell their shares in order to secure an 
immediate material benefit and not because they want to change the corporate strategy or 
replace the management. The management can neutralize or minimize such threats only by 
sharing a part of the income on the property with the shareholders, because with the lack of 
stability with regard to the general situation, any arguments as to the possibility of long-
term loss are not effective. 
In the majority of cases, however, the management tries to redistribute the shares 
immediately after completing the subscription in order to guarantee its possession of the 
controlling block of shares. As a rule the shares are purchased directly from employees at 
low prices close to the nominal value, and this procedure is accompanied by the promise to 
preserve jobs. But very often this purchasing is carried out with the help of intermediaries at 
even higher prices if the management attempts to conceal from the employees (at least for a 
short period of time) the fact that the shares are being accumulated in the hands of the 
management itself.  
If the danger of the disposal of the shares by the employees is not so serious, the 
management need not be in a hurry to buy up the shares. It applies mechanisms of 
transferring the administrative and controlling rights from minority shareholders to its own 
hands. The practice of electing department directors to be representatives to the 
shareholders’ meetings is fairly common. For example, at one of Samara’s enterprises 
internal "temporary regulations on the order of delegation of shares (votes) to collective 
plenipotentiary representatives for the trustee management" were adopted which openly 
recommended to the "shareholders" of major departments to transfer their shares to their 
directors for "trustee management," according to the traditional subordination structure. 
The insiders’ property is being clearly divided into the share belonging to the 
management and the share belonging to ordinary employees. Directors of departments and 
sometimes a small number of influential representatives of the "aristocracy of the working 
class" display an evident tendency to belong to the first group. In most cases it is easier for 
the management to integrate into the "ruling core" all individuals who could otherwise A. Radygin 
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become organizers of a consolidated inner opposition than to have to struggle with that 
opposition at a later date. 
In reality, the ordinary employees of many enterprises could not possess more than 50 
per cent of shares even if they privatized their enterprise according to the second variant 
because nearly everywhere a part of the shares assigned to the employees was acquired by 
pensioners and former employees, whose interests are somewhat different from the interests 
of current employees, and who tend to be more passive than even the most passive current 
employees. It can be suggested that their passivity is profitable for the management unless 
they sell their shares to an aggressive outside investor. Any consolidation of these two 
groups (former and current employees) is really possible only as a result of deliberate 
organizational action undertaken by the management. 
Additionally, some of the shares formally received by employees in reality belongs to 
the management of an enterprise right from the start. Perhaps this could have happened only 
in cases where the employees themselves did not actually pay for their shares, which were 
bought using money from some special fund (a situation which was typical of former rental 
enterprises with the right to redemption, especially in 1991-1992). The transformation of 
former directors (usually with a group of supporters) into "new businessmen" who 
accumulate a controlling block of shares or at least blocks of shares which can guarantee 
them major influence over decision-making cannot be judged in black-and-white terms. The 
opinion that it is the only realistic way under existing conditions obviously has some 
grounds. But the problem is that conditions change quickly. Thus, this line of development 
seems to be not a strategic but a temporary one characterizing an intermediate stage of the 
process. So far, joint-stock companies operate by inertia thanks to their monopolistic or 
"socially valued" position as well as because of the support of the state which, however 
minimal it may be, is still preserved to a certain extent. In the absence of outside 
investments, under conditions of true separation of state and enterprise finances, the present 
management of joint-stock companies will scarcely be able to carry out the modernization 
and rationalization of those enterprises. 
Major purchasers quite evidently dominated on check auctions. The lion’s share of the 
shares sold on a check auction (which averaged 20 per cent per enterprise) is purchased by 
check investment funds and intermediary firms which subsequently resell them to an 
institutional holder or the management. Whereas initially the ratio of the management to 
outside investment institutions as purchasers on check auctions was 4:1 in St. Petersburg, 
during the second half of 1993 and first half of 1994 it clearly changed in favor of outsider 
investors. This did not, however, imply any antagonism between these two groups. On the 
contrary, in many cases they are identical, as many check funds were deliberately created by 
the privatized enterprises themselves. In such cases check funds served the purpose of 
accumulating the resources for the "self-redemption" of enterprises and for purchases (by 
mutual agreement or "aggressively") of shares in the capital of their subcontractors and 
counterparts on the commodity market. In other cases, joint control over blocks of shares 
owned by the management and the shares purchased by the check fund was established. 
Among the major participants on check auctions, particularly worthy of mention are 
enterprises proper (or their intermediaries), check investment funds, and large institutional 
and private investors. Experience with Management and Employee Buyouts... 
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Whereas small investors were striving to invest their checks primarily in those 
enterprises which seemed reliable from a layman’s point of view, the motivations of funds 
and large outside investors were quite varied, including, for example, possession of a lot or 
a building, real profitability of an enterprise, resale of a large block of shares, the possibility 
of restructuring and capacity increase, or export opportunity. 
As for those enterprises which were buying up their own shares, the main motivation 
was, of course, possession of shares and, if possible, any other additional blocks of shares in 
order to keep the dividends "within the circle of the employees" and because of a fear of 
employment reductions as a result of the appearance of outside owners. These were the 
enterprises which agreed most willingly to participate in check auctions. However, there 
were also other advantages: the possibility to become a competent purchaser (and trust-
holder) in privatization when the share of the state in the authorized capital is reduced to 25 
per cent, redemption of a lot (which is possible only after check auctions), etc. 
Naturally, in the majority of cases the initiative as to purchase of the shares of an 
enterprise by its employees at a check auction comes from the management, which was 
acting according to a "traditional" scheme. A typical example of such a practice is the 
activity of one of the largest Russian enterprises in the area of mechanical engineering, the 
joint-stock company GAZ (Gorky machine-building plant), which bought shares through 15 
"dummy firms" and invested them on its own private auction over 1 million checks 
[Romanova, 1994]. In addition to the fact that the investment itself was illegal (the present 
share of the state prevents GAZ from being a purchaser in the course of privatization), the 
resources spent for this purpose are also likely to belong to the state. Another easy way to 
exclude "hostile" large investors, who usually submitted applications at the very last 
moment, was to close the application department earlier than was announced. This was a 
common practice adopted, for example, by "AvtoVAZ" on the Moscow check auctions 
[Kalinichenko, 1994]. In order to draw a veil of legitimacy over such actions, it was 
necessary to obtain the status of organizer of an auction of one’s own shares, and this was 
widely practiced by the leading Russian oil companies. Another widely used method is the 
holding of an auction on the closed territory of the company itself or in any other place with 
restricted access. 
The main tendency in 1994 in this sphere was a further reduction in the number of 
small investors, to the benefit of the above-mentioned purchasers. While in the middle of 
1993 the share of small private investors on the auctions amounted to 15 per cent of the 
shares offered for sale (half of them were the employees of the enterprise), in 1994 their 
share fell to 5-10 per cent. The large wholesale trade in shares of the privatized enterprises 
was typical of the initial share placing throughout regional stock exchanges (the South-Ural, 
the Vladivostok International, the Perm’ Commodity and Stock Exchange, the 
Ekaterinburg), which carried out regular tenders together with local property funds. 
The data received on December, 1994 (see Table 2), confirm the general results 
formulated above. It is obvious from a comparison of Table 1 (April 1994) and Table 2 
(December 1994) that dispersion of the share of employees continued during the whole 
period of research (the average reduction was from 52 per cent to 49.5 per cent) and that the 
share of the state was reduced (from 14.13 per cent to 6.9 per cent). Simultaneously the 
share of the management increased (from 14.16 per cent to 15.8 per cent), as did that of A. Radygin 
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outside investors. It is worth noting that the share of large outside investors increased most 
noticeably, from 11.53 per cent to 16.4 per cent. 
Table 2. Distribution of block of shares in joint-stock companies established during 
the process of privatization 
Shareholders   The Size of Blocks of Shares by Branches, % 
  Engineering  Chemical Ind.  Food Ind.  Light Ind.  Average 
Employees  46.00 47.00 49.00 56.00  49.5 
Managers  16.00 15.50 14.00 18.00  15.8 
Large  outsiders  19.00 17.50 21.00  8.00  16.4 
Small  outsiders  8.00  9.50 14.25 14.00  11.4 
The  state  11.00  10.50 1.75 4.00  6.9 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
439 joint-stock companies established on the basis of former state-owned enterprises in 
68 regions of Russia were surveyed. 
Source: GKI RF (1994), Braverman, Lyukmanov and Ivanov (1995). 
I will now discuss in more detail the problem of redistribution of the property 
dispersed among the employees of privatized enterprises. The problem is very delicate and 
subtle; therefore, it is hardly possible to expect reliable and exact information comparable to 
the official privatization procedures. According to some data, the employees of privatized 
enterprises (outside the management group) have already sold about one fourth of all their 
shares [Schleifer and Vasiliev, 1994]. 
The real situation seems to be not so homogeneous, depending to a great extent upon 
branch specificity. According to the data shown in Tables 1 and 3, the average block of 
employee shares was reduced only by 2.5 per cent, while the share of the management 
increased approximately by 1.6 per cent. Obviously, the increase of the blocks of shares 
belonging to outside investors (by 4.9 per cent for large investors and 3.2 per cent for small 
investors) occurs mainly at the expense of the state share, which fell by 7.2 per cent, and 
this happened in all the branches studied, achieving the maximum level in the light and food 
industries (over 13 per cent) and the minimum level in mechanical engineering (2 per cent). 
The dynamics of other changes by branches is even more interesting. The reduction of 
the block of employee shares was greatest in the chemical industry (7.5 per cent), and 
smallest in the light industry (0.1 per cent). The increase of the block of management shares 
was greatest in the chemical industry (7.5 per cent) and smallest in the food industry (0.6 
per cent), the increase of the block of shares belonging to large outside investors was 
greatest in the food industry (10.2 per cent) and smallest in light industry (0.7 per cent), and 
the increase of the block of shares belonging to small outside investors was greatest in light 
industry (7.6 per cent) and smallest in mechanical engineering (0.3 per cent). 
Whereas the increase of the block of shares belonging to the management in 
mechanical engineering and the food industry represented 20.3 per cent and 26.1 per cent 
respectively of the reduction of the employees’ block of shares (which meant redistribution 
of share capital to outsiders), in the chemical industry the increase of the block of Experience with Management and Employee Buyouts... 
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management shares almost equalled the reduction of the block of shares owned by ordinary 
employees. The comparison of reduction rates of the blocks of shares belonging to the state 
and the increase rates of the shares of outside investors leads to the following conclusions: 
whereas in mechanical engineering the contribution of the former factor to the latter factor 
is under 30 per cent, in the chemical and food industries the increase of the share of the 
outsiders (by 96.3 per cent and 89.4 per cent respectively) took place due to the state’s sale 
of its shares. 
A peculiar situation was observed in light industry, where only approximately two per 
cent of registered shifts in the share capital structure in favor of the management were 
accounted for by a reduction of the block of shares belonging to employees, while all the 
rest can be attributed to the reduction of the block of state shares. Approximately one third 
of the latter corresponded to the increase of the management’s block of shares, and a little 
under two thirds covered the shares belonging to outsiders (mainly small investors). The 
employee share stayed at the maximum level both in April 1994 and in December 1994 in 
the light industry, which remained the only branch where the employee share exceeded 50 
per cent and the share of small outside investors became larger than the share of large 
outside investors. 
However, the priorities of other share-holders changed. Whereas in April the largest 
blocks of shares belonging to the management and to large outside investors were observed 
in mechanical engineering enterprises, in December this distribution pattern could be seen 
in the light and food industries, respectively, to which small outside investors flowed at the 
expense of the chemical industry. At the same time, the reduction of the share of small 
outside investors was noted only in the chemical industry. The greatest state share in 
December was observed in mechanical engineering, whereas in April it was observed in 
light industry. Thus it is possible to state that the most important reduction of the shares of 
insiders (employees and management) occurred in mechanical engineering enterprises, a 
smaller reduction in the food industry, and practically no reduction in the chemical industry, 
while the insiders’ share in light industry increased, achieving the highest level among all 
four branches (74 per cent). In other branches the total share of insiders achieved a level of 
about 62-63 per cent. 
We believe that the changes described above adequately reflect the real situation in 
privatized industrial enterprises. They show that the interests of private capital as well as of 
small outside investors shifted towards the food industry, which is characterized by a 
comparatively low capital to output ratio, a short production cycle, and, to a certain extent, 
guaranteed sale of products. In contrast, the permanent crisis in light industry has produced 
a situation in which the share of large outside investors practically did not increase, while 
the employees’ share showed almost no reduction.  
Naturally, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the enterprises of the 
metallurgical industry and fuel and power industries were not included in the group of 
enterprises selected for the present research. Their capital in many cases is controlled by the 
state or by large outside investors, who benefited from the redistribution of shares 
previously owned by the state and by employees. Thus, according to the estimates made by 
experts of the Russian Credit Bank, in the share capital of the company "Chernogorneft" 
(Chernogor oil _ the only enterprise within the branch whose controlling block of shares A. Radygin 
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never belonged to the state), only 8-10 per cent of the shares belong to the employees, 
although during privatization procedure 62.27 per cent of the authorized capital was 
distributed to them. The rest of the shares were fixed as state property (check auctions were 
not included in the privatization plan). 
The first wave of primary distribution of shares of Russian privatized enterprises 
already allows us to suggest that the structure of the share capital of newly established joint-
stock companies tends not so much in the direction of the Anglo-American dispersion 
model as that of the continental European model with strict majoritarian control of the 
capital. Naturally, it also bears some specifically Russian features and is associated with all 
the drawbacks of the transitional period. 
At the same time, from our point of view, the formation of such a structure in the 
nearest future will hardly affect visibly the improvement of efficiency indices of privatized 
enterprises. That can be explained by the fact that although the greater part of the blocks of 
shares is concentrated in the hands of relatively large institutional holders, it is not intended 
at this stage for securing long-term management and control of the enterprise. That is why 
most of the present holders will hardly be interested in long-term investments dealing with 
reconstruction and development of enterprises. 
In a broader sense, all the aforesaid leads us to the following conclusion: in Russia 
there already exist all the necessary conditions for redistribution of the property initially 
distributed in the course of privatization on a scale comparable to that of the "grand 
privatization" of the first stage. Experience with Management and Employee Buyouts... 
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THE MASS PRIVATIZATION AND THE VOUCHER SYSTEM 
 
1. Privatization Programme 1992-1994 
Irrespective of the marked ideological shifts in the approaches in favour of a radical 
reform of relations of property at the edge of 1990-1991 some practical steps in this 
direction seemed to be a matter of remote future. At this time both the Union and Russia’s 
authorities made only their first "trials" regarding the concepts of privatization. Naturally, 
elaboration and adoption of a fundamental law on privatization seemed to be the first goal to 
achieve. 
The law of the RSFSR "On Privatization of the State and Municipal Enterprises in the 
RSFSR" was adopted on 3 July 1991. Article 1 of the law of the RSFSR "On Privatization 
of the State and Municipal Enterprises in the RSFSR" spells out that privatization "is an 
acquisition by citizens, joint-stock companies (partnerships) of various forms of property (as 
it is provided for by the law) from the state and from the local Soviets of the People’s 
Deputies as private property. The share of the state, local Soviet, or public organization, or 
charitable fund was limited to 25 per cent in the authorized capital of the buying legal 
entity. The law provided for a sale of shares of the enterprise being privatized, an auction 
sale or a sale through a tender, and certain benefits for the workers, and on the whole - a 
very wide range of all kinds of methods of privatization as well as possibilities for their 
interpretation. 
The administrative and bureaucracy aspect of privatization were given to the State 
Committee of the RSFSR for the Management of State Property (GKI) within the 
framework of the Government, while the actual selling or "holding" of property - it was a 
function of the Russian Federal Property Fund. Thus the element of dualism inserted into 
the diagram of control over the privatization process became one of the key elements that 
was a brake on the path of privatization and reinforced the confrontation at all levels of 
authority between the legislative and executive organs in 1991-1993. 
From November of 1991, after the changes in the composition of the Government of 
Russia, one can speak about a new stage in the ideology of privatization first of all, and on 
abrupt intensification of efforts to ensure a practical implementation of the privatization 
mechanism. From the very outset, having stated that privatization is one of the key elements 
of the economic reform, B. Eltsin’s and E.Gaidar’s Government stepped up their efforts in 
the area of development of the legislation on privatization, but at the same time it had no 
real opportunity of operational monitoring of the process of privatization. That is why one 
of the specific features of the economic reform of that government was a liberalization of 
prices before a period of wide-scale privatization which went beyond the dominating 
theoretical orthodoxy in the field of transition towards a market and was in contradiction 
with the experience of some foreign countries. And there were quite sound reasons for it: The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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 - it was impossible to wait for the end of the "large-scale privatization" conducted in a 
classical way (i.e. within a number of years), this being so because of the sharpest 
shortage of goods - the situation one could observe in 1991; 
 - if prices were not liberalized, any state-owned enterprise actually became a state entity 
to ensure an administrative distribution of goods in short supply which could grow 
(even without free prices) into a serious conflict (as a final outcome); 
 - intensive spontaneous privatization. 
A final version of the first State programme of privatization of the state-owned and 
municipal enterprises in the Russian Federation was adopted by a decree of the Supreme 
Soviet of the RF only on 11 June 1992. This programme adopted after a series of delays 
actually became a compromise, on the one hand between a "paid" (for the active part of the 
population) and gratuitous (with vouchers given to the entire population and the benefits 
given to work collectives) privatization and, on the other hand, between a model of 
privatization for all (GKI) and the division of property among the workers of enterprises 
(communists and workers’ unions). With all that all the previous documents were taken into 
account and the resultant compromise - an inevitable thing to launch the entire model grew 
finally into a defeat of the pro-Communist forces of the Parliament. It should also be 
stressed that it was that very document which became a basic document for the subsequent 
large-scale privatization in 1992-1994. 
According to the programme the privatization objectives were as follows: (a) 
emergence of a socially oriented market economy on the basis of the formation of the 
category of private owners; enhancing the efficiency of enterprises; (c) social infrastructure 
development using the gains from the privatization; (d) contribution to the financial 
stabilization; (e) contribution to the competitive economy and demonopolization; (f) 
attraction of foreign investors. However, in autumn and winter of 1992 the implementation 
of Russia’s model of mass privatization became a primary goal of the privatization policy 
on which both the President and the Russian government counted. 
All state owned enterprises were divided into 3 categories depending on the method of 
privatization used: 
 - small businesses (with an average work force of up to 200 employees and book value 
of the fixed capital less than 1 mln roubles as of 1 January, 1992) shall be sold at 
auctions and tenders; 
 - large-size enterprises (with an average work force more than 1,000 employees or a 
book value of the fixed capital of more than 50 mln roubles as of 1 January, 1992) 
shall be privatized by being transformed into open joint -stock companies; 
 - the remaining enterprises may be privatized by any method set in the Programme. 
To understand correctly the course for mass privatization it is essential to take into 
account not only the above-given classification of the enterprises from the point of view of 
the permissible methods of privatization but also the total number of enterprises that Russia 
had prior to the "programmed" privatization process. The total number of enterprises of all A. Radygin 
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sizes before the process of privatization made up not less than 240,000 units according to 
the data of the GKI.  At least that required high-speed and mass procedures of privatization. 
 
2. General Privatization Dynamics in 1992-1994 
It is paradoxical but with all the tensions in the area of political confrontation on the 
issues of the Russian privatization in the "upper echelons" and "in the field" the actual 
process of privatization in 1992-1994 was quite dynamic (see tables 1-3). 
The quantative success of privatization programme is quite evident. Within the 
framework of a small-scale privatization by 1 July 1994
1 Russia has already privatized 50 
per cent of all small businesses. In the course of a large scale privatization by 1 July 1994 
(on the basis of the medium-size and large-size state enterprises) more than 20,000 joint-
stock companies have been established. By the middle of 1994 Russia had about 40 mln 
shareholders in the just created new joint-stock companies or cheque investment funds. 
 By 1 July 1994 one could see 100,000 privatized enterprises. With reference to the 
total number of enterprises available by the start of the privatization programme  as many as 
40 % of enterprises have been privatized (table 1).  If in January 1992 there were about 
1500 applications for privatization, by 1 July 1994 the figure was already 137501, and out 
of this figure some 74,8 % have already been implemented (table 2). 
The most common method of small-scale privatization in commerce and public 
catering is a lease with a buy-out right approximately 46 and 52 %, while the number of 
items privatized by the contest it was 39 and 30 %. In the sphere of consumer services the 
prevailing form is sale through a tender (46 %). 12 % of all small-size enterprises were 
converted into joint-stock companies, 10 % were acquired by natural persons (not by the 
workers). And although the majority of buyers of the items of small-scale privatization are 
the workers themselves (about 70 % of all bargains) nevertherless, as the estimates show, 
only 10 % of the work collectives in St Petersburg could go about it without any "sponsor". 
The latter actually means the appearance on the stage of a large co-owner at the majority of 
small-scale privatized enterprises. 
Among the most important problems typical of most of the objects of small-scale 
privatization, it is important to note the retention of the profile of business after it gets 
privatized, an access to credits, the relations with the distribution warehouses (bases) that 
became independent enterprises. Now if prior to 1990 Russia had only 1400 commercial 
enterprises (since acting as legal entities were only trade associations of wholesale and retail 
trade together with their bases), in November of 1991 as commerce was more and more 
commercialized, some 70,,000 independent enterprises appeared. In many respects it 
conditioned a rupture of the former supply links. However, in our view the main problem 
remains to be the fact that most of the enterprises are being privatized without the premises 
                                              
1 The official deadline for voucher privatization programme, after which there was no important quantitative 
progress.  The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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which are leased and this is a kind of a "hook" by which the local authorities hold these 
enterprises. 
The aggegate analytical data of the privatization process in Russia in 1993-1994 on the 
whole exceeded the similar indicators for 1992 (see table 3). And though some indicators of 
the rates of privatization visibly swang to and fro within a year, and this sway was 
especially noticeable in the regions, the rates of privatization intensity went up significantly 
(the number of implemented applications / the number of enterprises subject to 
privatization): up to 0.820 in June 1994 and the average data of the order of 0.369 and 0.582 
in 1992 and 1993. 
Yet it should be noted that such successful results of privatization can be accounted for 
not only by the enthusiasm of the "microlevel" and the activities of the GKI but also by the 
build up of certain countertrends: the rates of the submission of applications got reduced 
which led to such high indicators of their realization. In other words, by the end of 1993 we 
can say that the so called peak of the voluntary and initiative privatization has been passed 
at the microlevel, and as to those enterprises that were left they can hardly be as active as in 
the period of 1992-1993. 
Even at this stage of analysis the above-given information makes it possible to arrive 
at very important conclusions from the point of view of the prospects of the further 
participation of the "outer" Russian and foreign investors in privatization: 
(1) those enterprises that are already involed in privatization (from the act of 
application submission to a post-privatization stage) because of the existing methods of 
privatization or lobby actions of the interested subjects are little interested in mostr cases or 
they are hard to get to for a serious foreign investor, at least at the stage of the initial 
placement of the shares; 
(2) those enterprises that have not yet travelled the path of privatization may be 
divided into four conventional groups: first of all, these are direct candidates for bankruptcy 
that do not have a strong management or some plans of development and that cannot 
imagine their life without any state subsidies; secondly, these are the enterprises where the 
situation is of reverse nature, i.e. where they have clear-cut plans and counteragents for 
transformations but which using all the means possible tried to avoid cheque 
privatizationhoping for a "money stage"; and thirdly, this is a group of enterprises which are 
put on the prohibitive list of the state programme of privatization; and fourthly, these are the 
above-described "nomenclature spots of paradise" that will be privatized but this will be a 
privatization "for one’s own lot". So out of all indicated groups only the second one, most 
probably, may be of practical interest for investors. 
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3. Mass Privatization Model in Russia (October 1992 - June 
1994) 
A very popular term "mass privatization" combines two independent but closely 
related processes: 
 - a corporatization of the medium-size and large-size state owned enterprises with a 
subsequent sale (transfer) of their shares into the hands of those citizens and non-state 
legal entities, i.e. it is a case of large privatization; 
 - providing all (or part) of the population with investment coupons (cheques, certificates, 
vouchers, etc.) which give a right for a part of the property being privatized (voucher 
privatization). 
In other words within the model of mass privatization corporatization is the supply 
side and equipping the population with vouchers is the demand side. Acting as a "synthesis" 
of these processes in the Russian version is a policy of the sales of the shares by means of a 
closed subscription and at the cheque auctions. 
 
3.1. Causes of the Programme Launch and Its Basic Concept 
Both the critics and the advocates of the cheque model whose validity period expired 
by 30 June 1994, agree on one thing: a formal, quantitative success ofthe programme of 
mass privatization is indisputable and evident. As to the results of the programme of mass 
privatization, which are beyond the framewok of the quantitative valuations, they always 
were and they are now a subject of heated and meaningful discussions as well as the subject 
of irrational speculations for political purposes. So to attempt to sum up some kind of results 
let us go back to 1992 and try to understand the real situation and purposes of the 
privatization cheque. 
Let us recall in what conditions a strategic decision was taken to launch a cheque 
model (summer of 1992) as a method of stimulating a privatization process in Russia. 
 - absence of the financially sound demand of the population; 
 - zero interest in privatization in Russia on the part of the foreign investors; 
 - the presence of over 240,000 state-owned and municipal enterprises (which required 
standard typical procedures of privatization); 
 - the necessity of the maximum high rates of the legal privatization process (at the first 
stage) to block an intensive spontaneous privatization and to ensure an irrversible type 
of economic changes on the whole; 
 - the relatively good public opinion. The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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All these factors became prevailing for the development and launching of the Russian 
cheque model. So what were the strategic goals ? Naturally, the goals were not those that 
had been laid down in the first and second state programmes of privatization. It seems to me 
that the geniune goal was as follows: TEMPORARY MASSIVE REDISTRIBUTION AND 
STRENGTHENING OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY 
WITH A MINIMUM OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS HOPING FOR FURTHER 
TRANSACTIONS IN FAVOUR OF EFFICIENT RESPONSIBLE OWNERS. 
 
3.2. Voucher Programme 
The concept of Russia’s voucher programme was approved at the sitting of the 
Government of the RF on 11 June 1992. Privatization cheques (privatization vouchers) 
represented state federal (and only federal) securities with a limited term of action, each of 
the vouchers at a face value of 10,000 roubles, and handed over to a bearer, with a right of a 
sale.  From 1 October to 31 January 1993 an overwhelming portion of the cheques was 
given to citizens: 148 mln vouchers. 
In the course of implementation of the voucher programme one of the key issues was 
an issue on a real purchasing power and a market price of a voucher. The initial position of 
the GKI was that it had to take into account the real cost of state enterprises and other 
property that could be sold for vouchers (35% or 1.4 trillion roubles in old balance prices). 
It was stressed that vouchers were used to acquire property at the old prices of the last 
balance sheet valuation and for that reason the actual purchasing power of the voucher 
should be considerably higher of the equivalent sum of 1992 in roubles and that its market 
price will have a tendency to go up. So if in October 1992 the representatives of the GKI 
gave an optimistic purchasing power of 200-300 thous roubles per voucher, in December 
that figure dropped and constituted only up to 12-13 thous. roubles. 
Immediately (in the first days of October 1992) an exchange and over-the -counter 
market of vouchers was formed and it showed that in Russia as such one had a price spread 
from 200 roubles to 70,000 roubles. The first stock exchange operations were begun at the 
Russian Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange with a cheque value up to 5,000 - 10,000 
roubles. During 1993 the rate of the cheque went up from half of the nominal rate up to two 
nominals and on the average it was kept at the level of 20,000 roubles during the first 
months of 1994 and finally with all the various fluctuations the rate reached some 40,000 
roubles. 
To a great extent the dynamics of the rate of the cheque was conditioned by a political 
situation, the rates of inflation and speculative exchange and over-the -counter turnover. To 
an extent a privatization cheque acquired the characteristics of a sort of financial instrument 
that was considered by the owner in separation from its real purpose. With all that it gives 
no reasons to treat the rate of the cheque as a certain value that has nothing to do with a 
privatization process. 
To begin with, it is the current market rate that was taken as a basis of the preliminary 
"market" evaluations of the shares and enterprises after the cheque auctions (let us take this A. Radygin 
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example, with the rate of the cheque auction of Bolshevik factory being 0.1, or, in other 
words, 1 share to a cheque, and with the market rate being 6,000 roubles a share with a 
nominal rate of 1,000 roubles may be evaluated as it is worth 6,000 roubles in "cheque 
money", and correspondingly the authorized capital is also valued as being at least 6 times 
higher). With all that is is quite obvious that an actual market price of the sold shares could 
be obtained only at the secondary market of the securities of the enterprises being privatized 
and this market, as we know, is in its rudimentary stage. 
Secondly, it is the current cheque market rate (real expenditures for its purchase) that 
one compared the profitability of purchase of one or another type of shares at cheque 
auctions. And yet again one has to make a reservation here: the cheque price of shares is set 
not so much because of the financial position of enterprises, but rather because of the 
number of shares presented for a sale as the sale of securities. 
Thirdly it is from the current rate of the cheque that the intensity of the purchases of 
the cheques depended. Those purchases were made by the enterprises themselves. 
Because of this any attempt made to value the real cost (statically or in dynamics)is 
doomed to fail, if one follows only one type of the method of evaluation. In our view, it is 
only if we take a multitude of the cheque rates that can give us a real picture. In current 
conditions an attempt to evaluate the cheque through the "profitability" of the enterprises 
(even in an indirect way - through the shares acquired) can hardly be fruitful and thus it is 
possible to have only "quasi-market" and "property" approaches: 
 - current market rate in the form of exchange and out-of-the exchange turnover (both 
cash and cashless turnover); 
 - market rate in terms of the moment of the issue of cheques i.e. the issue of the autumn 
of 1992 with a corresponding inflation adjustment; 
 - weighted average rate of the cheque auctions (the number of nominals per one cheque) 
as the most probable indicator of the true situation; 
 - weighted average rate of the cheque auctions taking into account the revaluations of the 
fixed assets of the enterprises. 
It is essential to point out that only 20% of the privatization cheques and fixed assets, 
judging by the estimates, belonged to the regions, their number being balanced, and in 
accordance with this, the market rates should be above the average rate.For example, if 
voucher coverage comprised only 53 % in the North, 58 % in Eastern Siberia, 76% in the 
Central and Black Soils area, 78% in the Far East, 92 % in the Povolzhie area, in the Ural 
the voucher excess is 3 %, in the North-West it is 8 %, in Northern Siberia it is 21 %, in the 
Volga-Vyatsk it is 22%, in the Central Area it is 25% and on the Caucas - 67%. As a result 
one has a certain localization of the voucher markets in some central points and another 
characteristic feature is the fact that it became quite profitable to play on the differences in 
the rates. One could get as much as 200 % profit there. 
More than once the government took a number of steps to support the rate of the 
cheque on the market (considering it as a pledge of prestige of one’s own): the increase of The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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quotas of the cheque payment for property up to 35-90 %, getting land, housing and 
municipal property involved in the general cheque turnover, and granting a permission for 
enterprises to purchase cheques from out of the means of privatization funds, mandatory 
payment of 50% of the closed subscription by means of cheques and so on. However, 
accelerated incorporation process has always remained a key issue to ensure further cheque 
auctions. 
 
3.3. Incorporation of State-Owned Enterprises 
The Decree of the President of the RF, No 721, on obligatory incorporation of the 
federal enterprises on 1 July 1992 can be interpreted as a first radical step of the 
Government in this direction. And although the quality of drawing up the standard 
documentation and deliberate primitive nature of certain procedures of incorporation can 
hardly be regarded on a very high level, nevertherless the very fact of accelerated 
transformation of some 6,000 enterprises into joint-stock companies may be justified by the 
following considerations: 
 - the issue of vouchers in conditions of likely investment crisis was considered by the 
GKI as a major effort of feeding the "investment demand" on the part of the 
population, and in this sence, turning a considerable number of enterprises into joint-
stock companies and the issue of shares were necessary to ensure adequate 
"investment supply";  
- corporate form of property (even if the owner is not changed) seemed to be more 
attractive for creating the conditions for the attraction of capital and flow of capital 
between the economic agents in a situation when there was a crisis with the sources of 
finance (problems of own profits, budget and loans from the banks). 
The incorporation of large-size state-owned enterprises began practically at once after 
the entry into force of the decree of the President N 721 (see table 4).The situation was as 
follows: if by 1 January 1993 the Register of enterprises subject to mandatory incorporation 
included 4979 enterprises, while those registered as joint-stock companies comprised 674 
enterprises, by 1 July 1994 thjese indicators were as follows: 7,121 and 4,368 enterprises. 
All in all by 1 July 1994 registered as joint-stock companies were over 20,000 former state 
enterprises with a total authorized capital comprising 1.1 trillion roubles (in old book 
values) and at various stages of incorporation one had (and they were included in the All-
Russia Register of enterprises being ioncorporated) over 30,000 enterprises with an 
estimated authorized capital more than 1.3 trillion roubles. And it is of interest to note that 
about 23,000 such enterprises joined the process of incorporation by their own free will.This 
way, if we treat this phenomenon formally, we shall see that the area of "supply" (within the 
terms of mass privatization) was prepared well enough. 
And yet at this very time one could also see one negative trend progressing: with the 
reduction of the shares 1 and 3 of the options of privileges for the workers in the course of 
incorporation of enterprises a more and more pronounced was becoming a dominant share 
of option 2 which, by 1 July 1994, averaged as many as 75 % (see appendix 1). And this A. Radygin 
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means that as many as 3/4 of the enterprises (against 2/3 in 1992) planned to buy out the 
controlling interest with the help of the work collectives neglecting the coefficient of growth 
1.7 with reference to the share nominal and 90 day term of the payment of the entire sum. 
The other motive for preferring version 2 was an aspiration of the workers to have total 
equality of rights for all from the members of the management to the category of unskilled 
manual workers. 
From the medium-term perspective such trend is dangerous: first of all the problem of 
corporate control may get exacerbated and secondly, the mobilization of investment 
resources may get worse.And though in the course of incorporation (privatization) closed 
joint-stock companies are not to be formed,the very fact that the controlling interest rests 
with the work collective may well lead to a situation when the diktat of the workers-
shareholders (or that of a narrow group of menegers who are not controlled by a formal 
owner) will objectively lead to the prevalence of the current consumption in comparison tyo 
a long-term development or it may be a case of the policy of management to the detriment 
of the interests of shareholders. In other words in case of a closed subscription one 
determines two likely and equally negative ways of development of a new type of a joint-
stock company: the appearance of an "aggressive consumer majority" (the presence of 
workers-shareholders) or the diktat of managers on the basis of dispersion of property. 
It goes without saying that in the perspective a major portion of the block of shares 
will be with the current "investors". And yet any intervening period between the moment of 
the original distribution of shares and the appearance of a serious owner of a large block of 
shares is certainly an undoubtful block hindering the effective control of a joint-stock 
company with all the subsequent fall-outs. From this point of view it seems prudent if 
gradually the rights of the workers at the enterprise are diminished. 
So far an outside Russian or foreign investor intending to buy at least a part of the 
block of shares that are distributed through a closed subscription will have to (in a direct 
way, through his branch or through a Russian intermediary) enter into negotiations with the 
workers on the subject of the immediate purchase of their shares (or buying these shares 
after the end of the subscription). As the practice shows, this is no problem, but it is hardly 
possible that this kind of approach will be of interest to a large investor who aims at the 
controlling interest. 
Moreover, there were numerous technical problems associated with the sale of shares 
using the means of a closed subscription for the workers. As it is estimated, firstly this is (a) 
a problem of payments by the privileged shares of options 1 and 3 because of the 
indivisibility of the cheque; (b) difficulty to conclude personal agreements on matters of the 
acquisition (transfer) of shares at large enterprises which leads to an increase of the term of 
subscription; (c) if the terms of subscription are tight, not all the potential participants of the 
subscription have enough time to realize their rights; (d) additional purchase of cheques at 
the market by large enterprises who made a preference for option 2, generates some 
individual and financial problems. One may also report on multiple cases of the direct 
violations of the Provisions on the conduct of a closed subscription. 
And at last what is just as important is that many stock companies that appeared in 
Russia have little similiarity with the "classical" ones.This concerns both the joint-stock The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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companies set up on the basis of the state-owned enterprises and, first of all, due to the 
specifics of the institution of their organs of management. In particular, the principles of 
formation of the Board of Directors which are now in force, as applied to the newly created 
stock companies make it quite possible to get a controlling interest by the local authorities 
(up to 20 % of the voting shares belonging to the local property fund whose representative 
together with a representative of the local authorities are members of the Board of Directors 
together with the General Director and a representative of the workers). 
In this connection the most important and current, and even to a larger extent medium-
term problem, which is just to be analyzed, is a problem of the post-privatization existence 
of the newly instituted stock companies. It envoles a broad spectrum of unsolved issues: 
management of the state blocks of shares and their determination in size order, delegation of 
the rights to manage the shares, payout of the dividends, the existing voting systems (voting 
trusts, powers of attorney, and so on) in large corporations, property trust operations, 
registration of the deals at the secondary markets (the latter thing is especially important to 
ensure an effective transfer of property rights) and so on. 
 
3.4. Policies of the Sale of Shares. Cheque Auctions 
In accordance with the course set by the GKI to ensure a priority backing of the 
voucher privatization, the regulations rigidly stipulate that there should be a sequence in the 
selling of the shares of a specific type of enterprise: a closed subscription for workers, sale 
of shares (it should be stressed that we speak here about shares and not blocks of shares) at a 
cheque auction, and only then out of the fund for incorporation for the workers of 
enterprises and other techniques. All enterprises that were forced to effect incorporation 
were divided into 5 groups in an arbitrary proportion, and those that got incorporated 
voluntarily depending on the period of registration of a stock company. Each group would 
have an extreme time to conduct cheque auctions. 
The number of shares subject to selling at a cheque auction was determined as a total 
number of shares that were subject to sale for cheques (from 35 to 90 % depending on the 
level of property), minus the number of shares sold for cheques via a closed subscription 
and to the officials of the administration at preferential terms. Later on a single mandatory 
quota of shares was determined that were put out for a cheque auction, 29 % from the total 
number. The first type of the application - without indication of the minimum of shares per 
1 cheque - it should be satisfied completely, and the second type of application - with an 
indication of the price - it should be satisfied depending on the demand for shares. Now 
taking into account the experience of the first auctions provision was also made for splitting 
the nominal of the shares to satisy all the applications of the first type.  
The first model-type cheque auctions were carried out in December 1992 in such cities 
as Moscow, St Petersburg, Vladimir, Nizhni-Novgorod and in some other cities. All in all in 
December 1992-June 1994 put out for auction were (it applies to 86 regions of Russia) more 
than 15,000 enterprises with a total authorized capital over 1.1 trillion roubles and with the 
number employed over 16 mln people or 1/2 of those engaged in industries (see table 5). On 
average 18.9 % of shares of each enterprise were put out for auctions (against 29 as required A. Radygin 
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by the law), and all in all sold for cheques (taking into account the closed subscription) - on 
average 71 % of shares (against 80 % as required by the regulations).The authorized capital 
of the joint-stock companies themselves whose shares were put out for auctions fluctuated 
from 1-2 mln up to 30 billion (RAO Norilsky Nikel) roubles while on average in Russia it is 
about 100 mln roubles. Almost the same spread is characteristic of the share of the 
authorized capital put out for auctions: minimum 3 % as is the case with joint-stock 
company "Stroitel" in the city of Vladivostok and maximum - 60 % as it is the case with 
joint-stock company "Sverdlovskdorstroy". 
As estimated by the GKI, being most popular (until the shares of the fuel and energy 
complex appeared) were certain types of enterprises of mechanical engineering, as well as 
enterprises of food industry, tobacco industry, furniture industry and wood-working 
industry.As well as hotels, enterpriseslocated in the most prestigious regionsas well as the 
largest enterprises (keeping in mind the liquidity of their shares) and small-size businesses 
(the hope here being that it will be easier to establish control there).What is observed in this 
picture is a marked spread of the rates depending ion the region, with the average weighted 
being 1.8 in all regions. The "cheapest" shares went with the enterprises ofthe provincial 
areas (up to 405 thousand-rouble-shares per one cheque) and as to the records on the most 
expensive shares - it was the enterprises in the capital which were small in size and located 
in the centre. On average one can speak in this case about a direct dependence between the 
number of shares put out for sale (and the size of the authorized capital accordingly) and the 
auction rate.  
The analysis of the sectoral structure of the cheques invested in the cheque auctions 
shows that enterprises of eight branches of industry account for 70 % of the cheques; the 
distribution by sectors of industry is as follows: mechanical engineering (11.4 %), 
metallurgy (11.1 %), chemical industry (10.5 %), oil and gas extraction (9.1 %), oil-refining 
industry (8.9 %), power industry (8.1 %),postal services and communications (5.8 %), 
transport engineering industry (5.0 %) [Privalov, Bessonov, Kalinichenko, et al., 1994, 
p.61]. 
It goes without saying that the special features of these industries are not associated 
with any serious financial analysis (at least in most cases) priort to making investments. The 
basic factor accounting for such "exterior" investments is one’s psychological perception of 
one or another type of industry or enterprise as a more or less "reliable" sector, this often 
being an erroneous perception having its effect on the rates at an auction. As to the 
institution al investors the reasons here are quite different and, as a rule, they are associated 
with a particular type of enterprise. 
Among participants in the activities of cheque auctions one should specifically single 
out such participants as the enterprises themselves (their intermediaries), cheque investment 
funds and large institutional and private investors. And if small investors tried, first of all, to 
invest their cheques in those enterprises that seemed "reliable" from the point of view of 
average person, the motives of the funds and large investors are quite different: a plot of 
land, a building,the actual profitability of an enterprise, a re-sale of a large block of shares, 
the possibilities of reconstruction and increase of capacities and, at last, export potential. The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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As to the enterprises themselves that re-purchase their own shares, it goes without 
saying that they were primarily after a controlling block of shares and, if possible, any other 
blocks of shares in addition to the controlling interest (this being done to retain dividends 
among the members of the work collective and because of the fear that one may lose his job 
if other owners of property appear). It is these type of enterprises that welcomed 
auctions,however, there are other advantages not to be overlooked: a possibility to become a 
full-fledged buyer (and thus trust-holder) in privatization when the share of the state gets 
reduced up to 25 % in the authorized capital, the buy-out of a plot of land (this being 
possible only after a cheque auction) and some other such considerations. 
Naturally, in most cases the initiative to buy one’s own shares would come from the 
management of certain plants operating on the basis of the recently "tried-out" pattern. A 
typical example of such activities is the activity of one of the largest Russia’s enterprises in 
automobile-making - AO "GAZ" that bought, through 15 dummy companies, and that put 
out for auction at its "own" cheque auction over 1 mln cheques. In addition to the fact that 
such investment is not legally qualified(with the assigned share of the state the GAZ cannot 
operate as a buyer in the course of privatization) the measn used for these goals are also, 
probably, state-owned. It is also evident that prior to the end of the work of the 
Government’s Commission one has as frozen the applications (and the monetary means) of 
all legitimate investors, especially if one takes into account the fact that the previous results 
of the auction may be cancelled and that a new auction may be assigned. 
In the practice of holding an auction one may resport to soome other trick designed to 
"cut off" the unwanted investors that submit their applications at the very last minute: 
closing the place that receives the applications earlier than it should have been as it was 
done by the AVTO-VAZ in Moscow [Kalinichenko, 1994 ]. To attribute some appearance 
of legality to this trick it is necessary to get a right of the organizer of an auction for one’s 
shares a trick that was quite successful with the largest oil companies in Russia. Another 
trick is holding a formally open cheque auction but on the closed territory of an enterprise 
or at some other hard-to-get- to place. 
Now because foreign investors use the services of intermediaries at the auctions, it is 
quite difficult to isolate the sectoral priorities or to identify the sphere of participation. 
In general the participation of foreign investors acting through intermediaries can be 
estimated rather roughly, at the size of 10-12 % of shares that were put out for auctions. 
Theie is a host of reasons for this: in addition to the general climate for foreign investments, 
one shall take into account a difficult access to auctions of the enterprises of the fuel and 
energy complex, apriori indefinate nature of the results of the auctions, no contolling 
interests at the auctions, lack of desire to flaunt the purchase made and other reasons. In 
addition to the recent problems with the acquisition of cheques and their investment, it is the 
lack of possibility of buying a controlling stock that is, perhaps, the most weighty reason for 
direct non-participation of foreign investors in such auctions. 
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3.5. Qualitative Results of the Implementation of the Mass Privatization 
Programme 
First of all, the expiration of the validity of the privatization checks marks the end of 
the first stage of the Russian privatization. This qualitative stage started in 1992 and was 
completed on 30 June, 1994. Despite various economic, political, and social problems 
connected with the circulation of the checks, the real fundamental task formulated in 
paragraph 3.1 has been fulfilled: the mass assignment and redistribution of property rights 
on a national scale. One can say that this transformation was purely formal and not always 
carried out in the most civilized way, but nevertheless it was only because of this 
privatization that Russia was able by mid-1994 to achieve the following: 
-   a corporate sector of the economy; 
- a stock exchange and an over-the-counter securities market, including an 
infrastructure for trading privatization vouchers, a system of privatization auctions, 
and a secondary market for the shares of privatized enterprises; 
- a system (so far transitional, but nevertheless quite powerful) of institutional 
investors in the form of check investment funds and other structures; 
- a social stratum which _ despite all its flaws, heterogeneity, and legal weaknesses _ 
can be called a stratum of owners. 
  We can say that in many respects due to the privatization program realized in 1992-
1994, effective barriers to the recreation of monopolies and the administrative, bureaucratic 
control of Russian enterprises were created, although it is still too early to discard the 
possibility of such a return to the past. When we take a broader perspective, we can say that 
the gigantic changes in the area of property relationships paved the way for a modification 




  In spite of all the shortcomings of the Russian privatization model, the first stage of 
its implementation is over. 
  Naturally, the emergence in Russia in 1992-1994 of a considerable number of private 
enterprises and millions of new owners does not mean that administrative and bureaucratic 
control issues have already vanished from the economic agenda or that new incentives have 
already been created to ensure the effective growth of production. However, it was 
impossible to achieve these things in the first stage. The main achievement is the creation of 
a new system of property rights on the national scale. That system is still amorphous, 
fragile, even embryonic, but it is a system which is finally capable of implementing some 
key final goals of the privatization reform, such as providing for economic efficiency and 
creating a base for a genuinely democratic society. The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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  In our view, an assessment of the Russian privatization program on the basis of a 
formal quantitative analysis of the current state of affairs is not appropriate. The positive 
qualitative result lies elsewhere; namely, in the beginning of the stage of transfer of property 
rights. Only after this process is well under way will we be able to speak about some 
tangible positive results of the Russian privatization model (assuming that a real capital 
market and system of property rights are formed). Thus, it is essential to take the whole 
package of problems into consideration _ both the economic ones mentioned earlier and 
those that relate to the social, political, and legal spheres. 
 First, we observe the problem of the stability of the currently binding legislation, 
which is closely connected with potentially destabilizing factors of a political or regional 
nature, the role of the nomenklatura, etc. 
 Second, there is the problem of the balance of interests in the process of the 
reformation of property relationships. While one can hardly disagree with the statement that 
the current Russian privatization model generates multiple problems and controversies that 
are connected with objective factors and government miscalculations, one must not forget 
that this model was formed in the course of a multilateral negotiation process, the result of 
which is a balance of economic interests of all the participants, embodied in the text of the 
relevant legislation. Only the further strengthening of this balance can lead to the 
irreversibility of the economic reforms. So the choice is really "simple": either we pursue a 
stable and consistent privatization policy to speed up the economic transformation, or we 
follow a long and agonizing process of "quasi-privatization" accompanied with social and 
political conflicts, strengthening of state control and bureaucratic structures and actual roll-
back of the radical reforms in the economy and society. Therefore, the core of policy in this 
sphere should be the refusal to allow for discrimination against any of the participants of the 
privatization process in favor of any other participants. There should be no restriction of the 
interests of the private sector in order to slow down privatization and strengthen the state 
sector at the cost of the private and "privatized" sectors, nor should there be any attempts to 
return any aspects of control over the privatized enterprises to the state in an attempt to 
implement spontaneous ("nomenklatura") privatization. 
  Third, a very serious problem is the absence of interconnections between the reforms 
of property relationships and other elements of the economic transformation. The Russian 
experience shows that the development of privatization programs must be coordinated with 
the development of industrial policy and the finance system (an institutional device that 
transforms savings into investments and selects directions for their subsequent use in the 
production sector of the economy via the mediation of finance markets and institutions). 
  Fourth, there is the problem of the adjustment of the current normative base, taking 
into account the above-mentioned factors as well as the quickest possible liquidation of the 
gaps in the legislation which defines the environment in which Russian private, privatized 
and state enterprises operate. Areas in which such gaps are particularly glaring and require 
urgent attention include securities market regulation, mortgage laws, trust regulation, 
company laws, and land and real estate law. From a long-term perspective it is vital to have 
a civilized criminal and civil code in general, and a detailed and effective body of contract 
law in particular. And it is this aspect of the reforms _ the creation of the legal environment, A. Radygin 
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which is not necessary for the short-term accelerated privatization, but for the long-term 
operating conditions of the privatized enterprises _ which is still in its infancy. 
  Only when these conditions have been created, the general improvement of finances 
has been established, vigorous anti-inflation measures have taken root, and the system of 
private savings has been developed, will it be possible to attract significant investment 
resources and to effectively restructure enterprises. In other words, any "pumping" of 
resources into the economy by the state, as well as Western assistance programs in this field, 
will be meaningless to a considerable extent until a mechanism of "fair" control is 
developed, private capital markets coordinate corporate governance and resource allocation, 
and civilized land and real estate markets and a civilized business law are established. For 
this reason the role of the state should be strictly limited to the creation of an appropriate 
legal environment on the basis of which it may be possible to effect indirect (soft) state 
regulation and strict state legal control. The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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Appendix 1: 
 Privileges for the personnel and administration of the enterprises being incorporated 
in accordance with the first programme of privatization. 
  Option 1: On a gratuitous basis all the members of the work collective in one 
particular period of time are given registered preference (non-voting) shares which shall 
comprise 25 % of the authorized capital but in total sum it should not be more than 20 
minimum sizes of the monthly remuneration for work in terms of payment for one worker; 
common shares up to 10 % of the authorized capital but in total sum it should not be more 
than 6 minimum sizes of the monthly remuneration for work in terms of payment for one 
worker with a discount of 30 % from the nominal and with a a deferment of repayment up 
to 3 years; on the basis of the contracts concluded the authorized officials of the 
administration are given a right (option) to acquire common stock (shares) by its face value 
that constitute up to 5 % from the size of the authorized capital but it should not be more 
than 2,000 of the minimum sizes of the monthly remunerations for work in terms of 
payment for one worker. 
 Option 2: all the members of the work collective are given a right to acquire common 
(voting) shares which shall constitute up to 51 % from the size of the authorized capital.  
Option 3: If a group of workers makes itself responsible for the execution of a 
privatization plan, for non-admission of its bankruptcy and if it gets a permit from the 
general meeting of the appropriate work collective, then the members of that group are 
given a right (option) to acquire (after an expiration of 1 year) 20 % from the authorized 
capital in the form of common stock (shares) by their face value. All the employees of an 
enterprise can buy common stock that shall constitute 20 % from the authorized capital but 
that sum shall not exceed the sum of 20 minimum monthly remunerations for work in terms 
of payment for one worker, with a discount of 30% from the vace value and a deferment of 
payment up to 3 years. The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 




Table 1. Ownership Structure in the RF by 1 July 1994, in %. 
  Public sector  Private sector 
Light industry  52 48 
Food industry  53 47 
Construction 65 35 
Construction materials industry  54 46 
Motor transport, auto repairs  58 42 
Wholesale trade  53 47 
Retail trade  45 55 
General Food catering  53 47 
Community services  45 55 
Other 79 21 
All in all by Russia/*  59 41 
*/The evaluations were rather conventional:  the share of the  private sector was 
calculated as a relation of the number of the privatized enterprises to the  sum  of  the  
privatized enterprises  and  state  enterprises  with  a separate balance sheet on the same 
date.  The  private  enterprises  that  were formed  outside  the privatization process 
were not taken into account in this evaluatiion. 
Source: data base of the GKI. A. Radygin 
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Table 2.  Basic indicators of the progress of privatization in the RF for 1992 - 1994 /* 
With a growing total rate 
since 1.01.1992 
1.04.1992 1.01.1993 1.04.1993 1.01.1994 1.04.1994 1.07.1994 
State enterprises with 
separate balance sheet 
(units) 
139904 204998 194190 156635 151486 138619 
Submitted applications for 
privatization (units) 
18366 102330 114725 125492 132605 137501 
Applications rejected (units)  656  5390  6879  9985  10802  11488 
Applications being 
processed (units) 
12677 46628 42788 24992 21637 19308 
Implemented application 
(units) 
5023 46815 61810 88577 98262  103796 
Selling price of property 
(billion roubles) 
1,9 157 297 752 901  1107 
Cost of enterprise property 
on the basis of implemented 
applications (billion 
roubles) 
1.1 193 405 648 788 958 
State enterprises turned into 
joint-stock companies 
whose shares are on sale 
(units) 
59  2376  4805 14073 16751 20298 
Enterprises  which  are  leased  9451 22216 19435 20886 19833 20606 
including enterprises 
which are leased with a 
buyout right 
7581  3868 10850 14978 14964 15658 
*/ 1 January 1992 is a date of the official launch of the Privatization Programme in 
Russia. 
Source: data base of the GKI 
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Table 3. Consolidated analytical table of the progress of privatization on the average 
in Russia: 1992-1994. 
  T1 T2 T3 T4  T5  /* 
On the average for 1992  0.430  0.457  0.197  0.532  0.369 
On the average for 1993  0.501  0.610  0.308  0.530  0.582 
For  1994:       
January  0.579 0.718 0.415 0.529 0.785 
February  0.587 0.727 0.427 0.533 0.802 
March  0.592 0.741 0.436 0.534 0.818 
April  0.597 0.747 0.445 0.535 0.833 
May  0.604 0.748 0.452 0.535 0.846 
June  0.588 0.749 0.441 0.537 0.820 
*/T1 - Rates of submission of applications ( the  number of  applications supplied/the number of 
enterprises with their own balance sheet);   
T2 - Rates of realization of applications (the   number   of  applications  realized  /  the  number  of 
applications supplied);   
T3 - Actual rates  of  privatization (the   number   of  realized  applications  /  the  number  of 
enterprises with their  own  separate  balance  sheet);  
T4 - Planned  rates  of privatization (the number of enterprises by the Programme  /the  number  of  
enterprises  with  their  own separate balance sheet);  
T5 - Intensity rate of privatization (the  number  of  applications  realized  /  the   number   of 
enterprises   subject   to  privatization  in  line  with  the Programme). 
Source: data base of the GKI. 
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Table 4.  The  results  of  incorporation  of  the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in 
the RF in line with the order N721 of 1 July 1994. 






  1.01.1993 1.07.1994 1.01.1993 1.07.1994 1.01.1993 1.07.1994 
Number of SOE subject for 
conversion into joint stock 
companies 
4979  7129 -     - - - 
Number of committees’ 
decisions for conversion 
2520 5437 2545  17738  /*  547 1784 
Number of adopted 
privatization plans and acts of 
assets valuation 
1326 4982 1546  17042  283 1053 
Number of registered joint 
stock companies 
674  4368 737  15936 139 997 
The charter capital (bln. 
roubles) 
116.5 834.8  28.6  247  2.7  23 
Value of assets, transferred by 
benefit options to employees 
and managers 
24.5  231.5 10.0  56 0.44  10 
*/ In this case the working commissions on  privatization are created by 1 Jan 1993 - at  
6565 enterprises, and by 1 July 1994 - at 21256 enterprises. 
Source: data base of the GKI. The Mass Privatization and the Voucher Systems 
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Table 5.  The  results  of  the  cheque auctions in the RF by months, by 1 July 1994 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)/* 
December 
1992 
18  9  3.0  42 0.51 16.9 0.16  3.2 
1993:          
January  107  26  5.7  184 0.60 10.6 0.15  4.0 
February  195  40  6.4  174 1.49 22.9 0.54  2.7 
March  436  56 22.5  525 5.27 23.5 2.25  2.3 
April  618  69 30.1  811 7.03 23.4 4.43  1.6 
May  577  72 23.3  519 4.60 19.7 3.62  1.2 
June  878  79 27.8  767 6.36 22.8 4.28  1.5 
July  895  81 35.0  690 8.14 23.2 6.64  1.2 
August  871  81 33.0  737 6.80 20.6 4.45  1.5 
September  792  83 37.8  792 7.39 19.6 4.71  1.5 
October  961  83 45.2  896 8.35 18.5 4.41  1.9 
November  934  83 46.3  805 8.64 18.7 2.78  3.0 
December  1021  83 48.1  976 8.70 18.1 3.38  2.5 
1994:          
January  733  84 46.0  635 9.07 19.7 3.09  2.9 
February  779  86 60.8  1266 13.6 22.5 4.51  3.0 
March  967  86  109.8  1017 16.6 15.1 8.90  1.9 
April  1057  86 96.6  1206 16.4 17.0 13.2  1.2 
May/**  1119  86 69.3  1070 16.0 23.2  8.0  1.8 
June/**  2621  86  386.3  3234 55.4 14.3 23.7  1.9 
All in all by all 
auctions/*** 
15779 86  1151  16816  202.8  18.9  104  1.8 
*/ (1) the number of enterprises;  
(2) the total number of regions where the auctions are held in line with the date;  
(3) the total authorized capital, billion roubles;  
(4) the number of people employed at the enterprise, thous.;   
(5) total sold authorized capital, billion roubles;  
(6) average weighted sold authorized capital,  in %;  
(7) the number of cheques accepted, mln (By  the  start of July 104 mln cheques have been accepted 
through the cheque auctions  and  40  mln  cheques  have  been accepted  through a closed subscription 
for the workers of the joint-stock companies. Thus by the official date of the end of the  cheque  
privatization all in all it has been collected at least 97 per cent of the  cheques  issued);   
(8)  the  average weighted rate at the auction (the number of 1,000-rouble shares per one cheque at the 
auction).      
**/ The data not full.       
***/ The aggregate data on all auctions may disagree with the sum of the results  by  months  since  the  
data  base  was updated all the time. 
Source: Data base of the GKI and of the Russian Centre of Privatization. 